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Risk is of all Time
BEN J. M. ALE
S umm a r y
Risk is everywhere and always has been. Although these risks seem new, industrial risk,
environmental risk and health risk have been around since the origin of mankind. Men always
have been trying to minimise these risk and manage them where possible. The risks of modern
technological society can be managed with the means this society has developed. But today just
as always the decision to reduce risk is political. Risk reduction policies are difficult to maintain
over prolonged periods of time. This holds especially for high consequence low probability
events. The absence of occurrences over long periods of time reinforces the illusion that these
events are impossible and will not happen. Until disaster strikes again!
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Risiko ist, und war immer, allgegenwärtig. Obwohl diese Risiken neu erscheinen, existie-
ren industrielle, Umwelt- und Gesundheitsrisiken seit Anfang der Menschheit. Der Mensch hat
immer versucht, diese Risiken zu minimieren und managen wo immer möglich. Mit den Risiken
der modernen technologischen Gesellschaft kann mit den entwickelten Verfahren umgegangen
werden. Heute wie in der Vergangenheit ist die Entscheidung zur Risikominimierung eine politi-
sche. Strategien zur Risikominimierung sind schwer über längere Zeiträume zu handhaben. Dies
trifft insbesondere zu für sehr folgenschwere aber nur sehr seltene Ereignisse. Das Ausbleiben von
solchen Ereignissen über längere Zeiträume stärkt die Illusion, dass sie nicht möglich sind und
nicht eintreten werden. Bis zur nächsten Katastrophe!
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is said that the present society is a risk society (BECK, 1986). And indeed some risks
are new. And because of the global connectivity of our societies, many risks are shared by
all. That does not take away though, that may ancient risks have had a similar standing in the
society in which they where dominant. They formed a threat to the whole – known – world
and all – known – societies were exposed.
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Between 1347 and 1350 the plague or the Black Death wiped out one third of the po-
pulation of Europe (CENTRAAL BUREAU VOOR DE STATISTIEK, 2004). In the 17th century the
average life expectancy was 25 years and to become 45 was an exception.
Also what now is called industrial risk has roots in the early centuries. Already Plinius
described illnesses among slaves (RAMAZZINI, 1700). In 1472 Dr U. Ellenbog fromAugsburg
wrote an eight page note on the hazards of silver, mercury and vapours of lead (ROSEN, 1976).
Ailments of the lungs found in miners were described extensively by Georg Bauer (AGRI-
COLA, 1556). In the seventeenth century a significant part of the crew of ships sailing the East
andWest Indies never made it home. As recent as 1918 the Spanish flue killed 170,000 people
in the Netherlands alone.
The Netherlands has a long history of having to deal with the threat of floods. In the
middle ages several groups, such as Hugenotes and Jews, fled to the Netherlands because
they were oppressed by their government. These people literally stepped down from the
Central European Plane into the Low Lands, the swamp that is the Netherlands. The only
authorities that were accepted for a long time were the „waterboards“. These were deemed
necessary to manage the flood defences. The oldest waterboards were those of Schieland
(1273), Rijnland (1286), and Delfland (1319). Nowwith 478 people per km2 one of the den-
sest populated area‘s in the world and housing a harbour of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport
and a third of the refinery capacity of Europe managing the risks of resulting from the close
proximity of people and industry has become just as important an activity as managing the
risks of flooding.
Attempts to avoid unnecessary risk also has been part of human activities from as long
as history is written. Those who had something to loose surrounded themselves and their
possessions with walls, castles, guards and armies. If you had enough money you went out-
side of the city to escape the plague. And societies have put people into power in order to
protect them from a long time ago.
This does not take away that worldwide and in absolute numbers the number of disasters
and the associated costs increase. At the same time the population of the earth increases, sug-
gesting that people more and more live in less and less suitable locations (OECD, 2003).
This raises the question why risk management looks so different today andwhywe have
so much difficulty getting to an organised policy on risk, whether we are in public office, in
government or in private enterprise. For this we first look at the evolution of risk especially
in the 20th century. We look at the development of risk perception research and findings
and then we look at methodologies to understand the genesis of accidents and strategies to
eliminate them or reduce the probability.
2. I n d u s t r i a l r i s k
In theNetherlands some large scale accidents with explosives materials occurred as well.
In 1654 the centre of Delft was demolished by the explosion of a powder tower. This explo-
sion, which could be heard 80 km away, created the “horse market”, which still exists as an
open space (Fig. 1).
In 1807 a similar explosion took place. Now a barge laden with black powder exploded
in the centre of Leiden. The van der Werf park today is still witness of this event. 150 people
were killed among who 50 children, whose school was demolished by the blast. This explo-
sion led to an imperial decree by Napoleon. The emperor stated that from then on a permit
was needed for having an industrial facility. Three classes of industry were designated:
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• Industries that were considered too dangerous to be inside a city. The authorities would
indicate a location.
• Industries for which location inside a city could be considered if it could be demonstrated
that there was no danger for the community.
• Industries that always could be located inside city limits.
In addition Napoleon stated that objections of future neighbours should be noted and
addressed by the authority that made a decision. As the explosion in Leiden involved a
ship, similar measures were taken with regards to the transportation of explosives and other
dangerous materials. Interestingly the safety regulations in France can be traced back to the
same imperial decree.
3. R i s k m a n a g e m e n t
The origin of modern risk management lies in the industrial accidents after World War
II. In 1966 a fire in a storage facility for LPG in Feyzin, France killed 18 and wounded 81.
This accident led to re-emphasis on design rules for bottom valves on pressure vessels. In the
realm of physical planning no actions from the French or the European authorities seemed
to have resulted from that accident.
Ten years later a number of similar accidents occurred: Flixborough (1974, 28 dead),
Beek (1975, 14 dead) and Los Alfaques (1978, 216 dead). These accidents showed that the
Feyzin accident was not a unique freak accident. Apparently LPG and other flammable
substances could pose a serious threat to the workforce and to the surroundings.
In 1979 Prime-Minister van Agt, just as his predecessors, wrote a letter to parliament
about the development of environmental policies as integral part of the nation’s policies. In
Fig. 1: The big thunder of Delft in 1654
Die Küste, 70 (2005), COMRISK, 173-184
176
this letter he introduced “External Safety” as separate from occupational safety. The Prime-
Minister introduced and announced three elements of a new policy:
• appointment of the minister of environment as co-ordinator for hazardous materials,
• founding of a new separate policy body dealing with external safety, and
• announcement of new legislation covering external safety.
At the same time a major change in the energy market appeared imminent. This among
other lead to amajormarket push for LPG asmotor fuel. In 1978 a tank car exploded in a tank
station. Although nobody was hurt in this accident, it became apparent that the population
around the stations should be limited. The chief inspector for the environment decided not to
wait for legislation. He issued an instruction for his inspectors to not approve a permit unless
the conditions for distances and population densities as indicated in the Table 1 were satisfied
(HIMH, 1981). This was the first explicit zoning measure around a hazardous activity.
A further potential increase in the transport of LPG through the Netherlands resulted
from the desire to use LPG as feedstock for the production of ethylene. A committee was
charged with developing a policy. A study was commissioned into the safety of the whole
chain from import to final use. It became apparent that a policy aimed at insuring that no
accident ever would harm the population would not be compatible with the limited space in
the Netherlands. The committee decided that there should be a level of risk below which it is
neither desirable nor economical to strive for further reduction. This statement implied that
the level of risk should be established and that acceptability limits should be set.
At the same time authorities in the Rijnmond area started to be worried about the safety
of the population around the large petro-chemical complexes in the area. Taking the Canvey
Island study as an example (HSE CANVEY, 1978; HSE CANVEY, 1981), the Rijnmond autho-
rity embarked on a study to establish whether quantification of risk was feasible and would
give results that would be useful in decision-making. The results (CREMER and WARNER,
1981) were promising with regards to the usefulness of the results. The quantification of
risk as a routine exercise was judged not to be feasible unless information technology could
be used to take away the burden of the many complicated calculations and reduce the time
needed.
The Rijnmond Authority together with the ministry of environment embarked on the
venture towards an automated method for quantification of risk. Now, twenty plus years
later the process still is not fully automated. Such a level of automation no longer is desired
either. But the techniques developed since together with the rapid development of computa-
tional capability has lead to workable systems with reasonable return times.
Tab. 1: Zoning around LP G station
Distance to tank and/or fillingpoint (m) Allowed building
Houses Offices
0 – 25 none none
25 – 50 max 2 max 10 people
50 – 100 max 8 max 30 people
100 – 150 max 15 max 60 people
> 150 no limit no limit
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3.1 Risk matrices
The division of risk in three bands introduced by Napoleon can be found back in the
risk matrices that are used frequently to support and structure decision making (Fig. 2). In
these matrices the two dimensions of risk: probability and consequences are separated out
and plotted against each other. Any combination of consequence and probability is a point
in this two dimensional space. Alternatively the risk profile of any activity can be plotted as
a so-called complementary cumulative distribution curve (CCDC). In such a curve the pro-
bability of exceeding certain consequences are given as a function of these consequences.
The plot area can be divided into three areas: acceptable, conditionally acceptable and
unacceptable. Whenever the risk is not in the acceptable area measures have to be taken or at
last contemplated. Of particular interest is the region in the lower right hand corner of the
matrix where those risks are located of which the consequences cannot be borne. These risks
have to be transferred e.g. by insurance, or have to be eliminated – regardless how low the
probability - as the consequences would lead to ruin.
In practice any consequence proves to be acceptable when the probability is sufficiently
remote and the advantages to be gained by embarking the risky activity are sufficiently large.
Fig. 2: Risk matrix
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Therefore the red or unacceptable area is seldom demarcated by a vertical line. Rather the
limit is some sort of sloping line as depicted by the dotted line in the figure.
The use of risk matrices is not restricted anymore to the chemical industry. Many appli-
cations are found in finance and insurance industries (MACARTHY et al., 2004).
3.2 C r i t e r i a
Having decided that risk quantification is the way to go the inseparable counterpart had
to be developed as well. Questions to be answered included were what to do with the results,
and how to make sure the analyses would actually be made and used in decision making. Re-
gional and local authorities as well as industry asked for guidance regarding the acceptability
of risk. The bases for this guidance was found in documents and decisions taken earlier.
An important base line was found in decisions made regarding the sea defences of the
Netherlands. In 1953 a large part of the south west of the Netherlands was flooded as a result
of a combination of heavy storms, high tides and insufficient strength and maintenance of
the diking system. Almost two thousand people lost their lives and the material damage was
enormous especially because the Netherlands was still recovering from World War II. The
Netherlands embarked on a project to strengthen the sea defences, including a drastic shor-
tening of the coastline by damming off all but one of the major estuaries of the Rhine/Maas
delta. The design criteria were determined on the basis of a proposal of the so-called “Delta
Committee” who proposed that the dikes should be so high that the sea would only reach
the top once every 10,000 years (DELTA COMMISSIE, 1960). The probability of the dike col-
lapsing is a factor of 10 lower. The probability of drowning is another factor of 10 lower, so
that the recommendation of the Delta Committee implies an individual risk of drowning in
the areas at risk of 1 in a million per year. This recommendation was subsequently converted
into law.
This value of risk was reaffirmed when a decision had to be taken about the construction
of the closure of the Oosterschelde estuary. For reasons of preserving the ecosystems the
design was changed from a closed solid dam, to a movable barrier. This barrier should give
the same protection as the dams. In this manner Dutch parliament had a history of debating
safety in terms of probabilistic expectations, which came in handy when industrial risk had
to be discussed.
The value of 1 in a million per year corresponds to about 1% of the probability of being
killed on the road in the mid 80-ties. This became the maximum acceptable addition to the
risk of death for any individual resulting from industrial accidents.
For societal risk the anchor point was found in the “interim viewpoint” regarding LPG
points of sale mentioned above. When combined with value already chosen for individual
risk this led to the point 10 people killed at a frequency of 1 in 100,000 per year. As societal
risk usually is depicted as an FN curve having the frequency of exceeding N victims as a
function of N, the limit had to be given the same form. Thus the slope of the limit line had
to be determined. It was decided to incorporate the apparent aversion against large disas-
ters in de the national limit by having the slope steeper than –1. Several values circulated in
literature at the time, ranging from –1.2 to –2 (FARMER, 1967; MELEIS and ERDMAN, 1972;
TURKENBURG, 1974; WILSON, 1975, OKRENT, 1981; RABASH, 1985; SMETS, 1985; HUBERT
et al., 1990). In the end it was decided to adopt a slope of –2 for the limit line. In order to
bind the decision space at the lower end of the risk spectrum limits of negligibility were
set for individual risk and societal risk alike at 1% of value of the acceptability limit. The
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resulting complex of limit values was laid down in a policy document called “premises for
risk management”.
The accident in Bhopal, where some 3000 people were killed as a result of a release of
methyl isocyanate, helped to promote the adoption of European legislation. The SEVESO
directive, named after a small village in Italy where dioxine was relaesed in an accident,
became the vehicle to implement these policies into law in the Netherlands just as in many
other members of the EU. The “Hazards ofMajor Accidents Decree” demanded that top tier
establishments would submit a safety report, in which a quantified risk analysis performed
according to the set standards, would be presented. This information then subsequently
could be used by local planners for zoning decision and by the emergency services for disaster
abatement planning.
Fig. 3: Risk triangle and criteria
On 13 may 2000 an explosion occurred in a fireworks storage and trading facility in En-
schede, the Netherlands. Twenty-two people were killed and some 900 injured. The material
damage was approximately 400 MEuro. This lead to a further re-enforcement of the policy
in the Decree on External Safety of Establishments (BEVI), in which the risk limits were
again specified (Fig. 3).
4. P e r c e p t i o n
A major factor influencing the people’s reaction to potentially hazardous activities is
what generally is described as risk perception.
In part these perceptions are driven by the way, by which information is processed by
our brain. One of the features is that information that strengthens existing ideas is more rea-
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dily absorbed than information to the contrary. In Table 2 the mortality of various activities
is given. The numbers are applicable for the Netherlands. From the table it can be seen that
the probability of any Dutchman to be killed by an accident in a chemical plant not being an
employee is 6 orders ofmagnitude smaller than the probability of dying of a smoking induced
illness (if he or she is a smoker).
On the basis of these numbers a decision maker has a fair point when assuming that the
probability of him being confronted with a disaster in the chemical industry is remote and
hardly probable. Especially when one notes that the present Netherlands are only some 200
years old
In the table also the probabilities are given of winning the main prize for five of the
nation’s lotteries. One can see that winning the „sponsorlottery“ is three orders ofmagnitude
smaller than being the victim of a chemical accident.Nevertheless these lottery tickets are rea-
dily sold and there regularly is a winner. Apparently the probability of winning this lottery is
considered bymany remote but possible, or even probable. This difference in appreciation of
the numerical information is closely related to the psycho-social theories of risk perception.
According go these theories there are many factors shaping the perception of risky activities
(VLEK, 1996; SLOVIC, 1999; SJOBERG, 2000). The top 10 of the most listed are:
• Extent and probability of damage
• Catastrophic potential
• Involuntariness
• Non-equity
• Uncontrollability
• Lack of confidence
• New technology
• Non-clarity about advantages
• Familiarity with the victims
• Harmful intent
Tab. 2: Probabilities of death and probabilities of winning lotteries
Activity Winning a lottery Probabilty (/yr)
Smoking 5*10-3
Traffic 8*10-5
Lightning 5*10-7
Bee-Sting 2*10-7
Flood 1*10-7
Staatsloterij 1*10-7
Bankgiroloterij 4*10-8
Lotto 2*10-8
Falling Aircraft 2*10-8
Postcodeloterij 1*10-8
Chemical Industry 6*10-9
Sponsorloterij 3*10-12
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Combining these factors with the mortality discussed above reinforces that people are
more willing to accept a certain small loss than an uncertain large loss. And because the
probability of a large disaster is small, long periods of time may elapse after one disaster
before another strike. In this period the notion that improbable equals impossible is steadily
reinforced and thus the impetus that exists shortly after a disaster to do something about it
disappears.
As the factors that influence the judgement of a risky activity are different for differing
activities it cannot be expected that a single set of risk criteria is applicable to all activities.
Nevertheless a policy may look more organized as the set of applicable criteria is small.
On the other hand it is argued that these factors make it impossible to set general stan-
dards, as every situation and every activity is different. In a more extreme stance it is argued
that risk is a social construct rather than something that in principle can be determined
scientifically. In this view there are so many subjective choices made in risk analyses that
they cannot be called objective science at all (VAN ASSELT, 2000). Scientists are just other
lay-people. There judgement is influenced by the same factors, but in addition they let their
science influence by their political judgements. It is no surprises that the more objectivist
risk analysts argue that scientific judgements and political judgements are not the same thing
and that objective quantification of risk is a scientific exercise. Indeed such objectivity is
necessary to make cost benefit based decisions. In such argumentation the value of the risk
should be as objective as the – monetary – value of potential risk reducing measures (TENGS
et al., 1995).
Any policy should conform to general principles of justice and democracy, be it setting
a speed limit or a limit on risk. The results should be predictable for the stakeholders and for
the public and execution should be measurable against objective standards. This holds even
when arguments are formulated in more qualitative terms such as “As Low As Reasonably
Achievable” or “gross disproportionality”. It should always be borne in mind that any sta-
keholder in any regulatory system can resort to getting a dispute settled in court.
How valid the arguments may be, they nevertheless are of great help to stakeholders that
have no interest in having risks limited by a government policy in the short run. And as the
last accident disappears in past history the pressure to be firm on risk dissolves.
4.1 B o w - t i e s
Whenever a strategy or policy is defined that asks for reduction of risk, an analysis has
to be made of what would be the optimal place to interfere with the causal chain from cause
to accident and consequences in order to obtain the desired reduction. Bowtie models are
tools for integrating broad classes of cause-consequence models. The familiar fault and tree-
event tree models are ‘bowtied’ in this way; indeed, attaching the fault tree’s ‘top event’ with
the event tree’s ‘initiating event’ originally suggested the bowtie metaphor. The bowtie may
be conceived as a ‘lens’ for focusing on causal chains and ‘projecting’ these onto the space
of consequences. These consequences will ultimately be factored into decision problems for
risk management. Hence the bowtie’s consequence side forms an interface with the decision
models. Decisions taken will reflect backwards to causes. This structure not only has pro-
ven a worthwhile concept in accident prediction, it also has proven its worth in analysing
past accidents and suggesting improvements to prevent further re-occurrence (GROENEWEG,
1998) (Fig. 4).
The selection of the centre of the bow-tie is crucial for the analysis. Any event can be
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taken as this centre. The causes and consequences of this event form the bow-tie and form
a slice out of all the things that happen in this world.. Any event can be considered a cause
and any event can be considered a consequence. Events can therefore serve as causes and as
consequences in many bow-ties, each with its own centre. However: once the centre is cho-
sen, no other events will be visible in the bow-tie than those which are in the causal chains
running through the centre.
This could raise some interesting questions. What has to be considered as the centre
event of a – lethal – accident of a parachute jumper. The moment that his parachute did not
open, the moment that his parachute was packed in the wrong way or the moment that the
reserve parachute failed to open. Any of these three approaches leads to a valid bow-tie, and
to a valid quantification of his risk of falling, but the analysis will be much more detailed on
some aspects and much less detailed on others depending on the choice of the centre event.
As a result the options for remedial action will be different.
4.2 E v e n t s a s b a r r i e r s
When the a certain consequence is deemed unacceptable or when the probability of a
certain outcome is deemed too high, measures have to be taken to either take away the causes
or block the progression from cause to accident. The classical way of presenting this and
handling this in a mathematical way is to combine the path originating from a cause with
Fig. 4: Bow-tie and Murphy’s law
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a path from a safeguard into an „AND“-gate, which means that the cause and the failure
of the safeguard have to occur simultaneously to result in the consequence. This concept
however proved to be difficult to grasp for decision makers. Therefore these safeguards are
often depicted as barriers in the path from cause to consequence (Figure 5), an idea originally
developed by Haddon, who introduced the barrier concept in 1973 (HADDON, 1973). The
number of barriers in the path then could form the basis for a layer of protection analysis
(LOPA). In any case this way of presenting layers of protection proves to be helpful for de-
cisionmakers. When in an analysis a path is detected that does not have any barriers in it, it
constitutes a – latent – deficiency in the system that according to Murphy‘s law will sooner
or later lead to ruin.
Fig. 5: And-gate representation (A) and barrier representation (B) of the same causal configuration
5. C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Modern times are not necessarily more risky than earlier times. There have been many
threats to humanity that indeed wiped out significant portions of the known population. Life
expectancy has not been as high as it is today, at least in the „first“ world. There are some new
risks and may be contrary to historic times it is now known for sure that the known world
is all the world there is. But the historic people thought the same.
All over history it has been difficult to maintain risk containment or risk management
strategies for prolonged periods of time. For low probability large consequence type risks
this is to a significant extent inherent to the way the human brain processes information.
Every day a disaster does not happen the idea gets reinforced that it cannot happen at all.
Nevertheless there are many good methods to systematically deal with risks and many
are part of the policy of governments. Due to the dense population and the intensive use of
space in the Netherlands, the Dutch authorities have an advanced position in governmental
risk management, which combines the sue of quantitative analytical methods with set criteria
and rules for justifying risk taking by authorities.
Risk analysts have a role to play in the discussion about risks. They are in a position to
point out that the absence so far of an accident does not mean its impossibility. And they
should do so in the interest of the innocent bystanders, who are the people of who the lives,
health and property are at stake.
Die Küste, 70 (2005), COMRISK, 173-184
184
6. L i t e r a t u r e
AGRICOLA: Re metallica, 1556.
BECK, U.: „Risikogesellschaft. Auf demWeg in eine andere Moderne“, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am
Main, eerste druk, 1986.
CENTRAALBUREAU VOOR DE STATISTIEK (Ed.): Nederland langs de Europesemeetlat, DenHaag,
2004.
CREMER and WARNER: Risk Analysis of Six Potentially Hazardous Objects in the Rijnmond
Area, London, 1981.
DELTA COMMISSIE (Ed.): Rapport van de Deltacommissie, Delta wet 1957, Den Haag, 1960.
FARMER, F. R.: Reactor Safety and Siting, a proposed risk-criterium, Nuclear Safety, 8, 539,
1967.
GROENEWEG, J.: Controlling the Controllable, DSWO press , Leiden, 1998.
HADDON JR., W.: Energy Damage and the Ten Counter Measure Strategies, Human Factors
Journal, 1973.
HIMH (Ed.): Het interim standpunt LPGstations, The Netherlands, 1978.
HSE Canvey (Ed.): An investigation of Potential Hazards from Operations in the Canvey Is-
land/Thurrock Area, Londen (HMSO), 1978.
HSE Canvey (Ed.): Second Report, A Review of the Potential Hazards from Operations in
the Canvey Island Thurrock Area Three Years after Publication of the Canvey Report,
Londen (HMSO), 1981.
HUBERT, PH., BARNI, M. H. and MOATTI, J. P.: Elicitation of criteria for management of major
hazards, 2nd SRA conference, April 2–3 1990, Laxenburg, Austria, 1990.
MACARTHY, M. P. and FLYNN, T. P.: Risk from the CEO and Board Perspective, McGaw-Hill
New York, 2004.
MELEIS, M. and ERDMAN, R. C.: The development of reactor siting criteria based upon risk pro-
bability. Nuclear Safety, 13, 22, 1972.
OECD (Ed.): Emerging Risks in the 21st Century, An OECD International Futures Project,
2003.
OKRENT, J.: Industrial Risk, Proc. R. Soc. 372, 133–149, London, 1981.
RASBASH, D. J.: Criteria for Acceptability for Use with Quantitative Approaches to Fire Safety,
Fire Safety Journal, 8, 141–158, 1985.
RAMAZZINI: De morbis artificum deatriba, 1700.
ROSEN: A History of public health, MD publications, New York, 1976.
SJOBERG, L.: Factors in Risk Perception, Risk Anal, vol. 20 nr 1, 1–11, 2000.
SLOVIC, P.: Emotion, sex, politics and science: surveying the risk assessment battlefield, Risk
Anal, vol. 19 nr 4, 689–701, 1999.
SMETS, H.: Compensation for Exceptional Environmental Damage Caused by Industrial Ac-
tivities, Conference on Transportation, Storage and Disposal of Hazardous Materials,
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, 1985.
TENGS, T. O., ADAMS, M. E., PLISKIN, J. S., SAFRAN, D. G., SIEGEL, J. E., WEINSTEIN, M., and
GRAHAM, J. D.: Five hundred life saving interventions and their cost effectiveness, Risk
Anal, 15, 369–390, 1995.
TURKENBURG, W. C.: Reactorveiligheid en risico-analyse, De Ingenieur, vol. 86 nr 10, 189–192,
1974.
VAN ASSELT, M. B. A.: Perspectives on uncertainty and risk, The PRIMA approach to decision
support, Kluwer, 2000.
VLEK, C.: A multi-stage, multi-level and multi-attribute perspective on risk assessment decision
making and risk control, Risk Decision Policy, vol. 1, 9–31, 1996.
WILSON, R.: The Cost of Safety, New Scientist, 68, 274–275, 1975.
Die Küste, 70 (2005), COMRISK, 173-184
